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Abstract  
In this paper the differences in the incidence of pay for performance plans between 
occupations in a sample of Spanish manufacturing establishments are analysed. Our results show 
that there are significant differences between occupations in the incidence of individual, group 
and firm or plant pay for performance plans. The roles of establishment size, multinational 
ownership and the human resource department in the incidence of pay for performance plans and 
their variability of use across occupations within the same firm are also studied. These factors are 
found to correlate to a greater use of pay for performance and, in most cases, this effect is 
homogenous across occupations. 
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The approaches to human resource management (hereafter HRM) and the employment 
practices adopted by employers change over time, as the circumstances that surround 
organizations evolve. In recent years, firms are facing an increasingly global and competitive 
business environment, as well as unpredictable and rapidly changing product markets. As a 
result, certain HRM practices are gaining popularity among employers. One of these practices is 
pay for performance (hereafter PFP) (Brown and Heywood 2002), which is considered to 
improve organizational outcomes by enhancing employee motivation and identification with the 
objectives of the firm (Pfeffer 1998), and by enabling flexibility within the firm’s reward system.  
When designing their HRM systems, organizations have to decide not only which 
practices they are going to adopt, but also how they are going to implement them. One of the 
dimensions of the process of employment practices implementation concerns their diffusion 
among different occupational groups of workers. While there is extensive literature on the 
adoption of HRM practices by organizations, less effort has been made to discern and compare 
the application of these practices to different occupations (Werner and Ward 2004). Despite 
being an underdeveloped issue, the diffusion of HRM practices among occupations has been 
indirectly tackled in the past. Hence, some studies assume that HRM practices are uniformly 
applied to the entire workforce within an organization (Huselid 1995; Snell and Dean 1992). 
Other analyses focus on the examination of the implementation of these practices for a certain 
occupation, wherein the “core” or largest occupational group within the organization is most 
frequently considered (Batt 2002; Forth and Millward 2004). However, a body of research that 
advocates the differential application of HRM practices to different types of jobs has emerged in 
recent years. This stream of research maintains that the specific contributions of different groups 
of employees to the objectives of the firm result in variability in the application of HRM practices 
among them (Lepak and Snell 2002).  
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In light of recent developments in the field, the objective of this paper is to contribute to 
the analysis of the use of PFP systems, paying particular attention to their diffusion among 
groups of workers. Two questions are addressed in this regard. First, to what extent does 
occupational category influence the implementation of PFP systems within establishments? The 
agency theory suggests that occupation certainly has an effect on the design of PFP systems 
within establishments.  
The second question is related to strategic pay and concerns whether or not the use and 
variability of use between occupations of PFP are influenced by contingent factors such as the 
size of the establishment, the presence of a human resource department (hereafter, HR 
department) and foreign ownership. More precisely, our aim is to examine not only how the 
factors mentioned shape the use of PFP, but also if their effect varies across occupations within 
the same firm. In contrast to agency theory and the strategic pay arguments, the best practices 
approach and institutional theory, among others, suggest that occupational status and the 
contingent factors previously mentioned are not significant determinants in the use of PFP.  
The analysis is based on a newly-created Spanish data set that contains information on the 
use of PFP for various occupational groups of workers within the same establishment. Our 
empirical strategy consists in studying the determinants of the use of any PFP, as well as three 
particular systems: pay linked to individual performance (hereafter IPFP), group performance 
(hereafter GPFP) and plant or firm performance (hereafter FPFP). The following occupations are 
considered: top executives, professionals, middle managers, administrative workers, sales 
employees and production workers.  
 
 
 
 
3 
Theoretical approaches to the diffusion of PFP across occupations 
Despite the fact that literature on the topic is scarce, we can gain an insight into the 
diffusion of HRM practices through the examination of related bodies of research. Hence, some 
theoretical approaches to HRM suggest that work practices are uniformly applied to the entire 
workforce within an organization. One of these is the best practices approach, which defends the 
universality of high-involvement practices (Pfeffer 1998). According to this literature, there is a 
set of practices whose adoption generates benefits for organizational performance irrespective of 
the particular characteristics of the firm; PFP is one such practice. From this perspective, it can be 
inferred that PFP will be homogeneously implemented across occupational groups of workers.   
An economies of scale point of view can also help us to understand the pattern of PFP use 
within establishments. The adoption of these systems implies the assumption of fixed costs in 
implementation. If they are applied to more than one group of workers, the fixed costs can be 
spread over more employees. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that establishments may be 
more inclined to adopt a PFP scheme if they can apply it to various occupations. Similarly, 
establishments that have already carried out a PFP plan for an occupation will find it easier to 
extend it to other groups of workers (Jirjahn and Stephan 2004).  
According to the bargaining theories of wage determination, if an organization generates 
rents and employees possess some bargaining power, they can fight for a share of those rents. As 
stated by these theories, it is possible that the worker’s power to appropriate firm rents leads to a 
high correlation in the level of wages between occupations. This may be due, for example, to the 
fact that the bargaining power of workers is uniform across job categories, or that employees 
band together in order to exert more pressure on the employer (Groshen 1991). A dimension of 
the bargaining theory that is relevant for our analysis is the influence that trade unions have on 
the implementation of PFP. It is often argued that trade unions oppose the discriminatory 
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application of pay systems across employees, which suggests that they will favor the uniform 
adoption of pay practices for different occupations.  
Finally, institutional theory emphasizes how institutions shape the structure of an 
organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). In order to survive and gain legitimacy, organizations 
adapt to the institutional environment in which they operate. Adaptation to the institutional 
environment leads to a process of isomorphism, that is, a resemblance between the organizations 
of a population. In light of this theory, a convergence towards homogeneous HRM practices such 
as PFP across organizations may be expected. The process of isomorphism could extend to 
comparisons between groups of workers, leading to similarities in the use of PFP for different 
occupations. 
A contrasting perspective advocates the differential application of HRM practices to 
different groups of workers. This line of research maintains that the specific contributions of 
groups of employees to the objectives of the firm result in variability in the application of HRM 
practices within organizations. Among the existing studies in this field, the work of Lepak and 
Snell (1999) is worth mentioning. These authors made use of the human capital theory, the 
resource-based view of the firm and transaction costs economics to support the idea that the 
practices of HRM applied to a group of employees depend on the particular features of the group. 
Their argument may be explained as follows. The human capital of an organization can be 
classified according to their value and uniqueness to the firm, which results in the establishment 
of different employment modes within the organization, each of which is associated with a 
particular type of employment relationship. As a result, organizations apply specific HRM 
practices to each group of employees within the firm depending on the employment relationship 
established between the group and the employer. One of the dimensions of HRM that is 
specifically cited by Lepak and Snell (1999) concerns compensation issues. The agency theory 
 
 
 
5 
also points to a specific design of compensation systems for each occupation (Eisenhardt 1989). 
According to this theory, incentive design depends on how work is organized. To the extent that 
work organization varies across groups of workers, one can expect differences in the use of PFP 
between occupations. In line with these arguments, Baron and Kreps (1999) defended the need to 
design appropriate compensation systems for the different occupational groups of workers 
present within organizations. The authors stated that the determination of the level, basis, 
distribution and form of compensation often involves formal job analysis and evaluation, because 
each job is characterized in terms of various common dimensions and distinctions, such as the 
types and complexity of knowledge required, the number of employees supervised, the amount of 
capital overseen, the type and unpleasantness of working conditions, and so on. Overall, this 
stream of research suggests that we might find differences in the implementation of PFP across 
occupational groups of workers due to their different contributions to establishment performance 
and their specific job characteristics and functions within the organization.  
 
Review of the empirical evidence on the diffusion of HRM practices across occupations  
In this section, we summarize existing evidence of the diffusion of HRM practices across 
groups of workers. In order to gain more insight into the diffusion of pay practices in particular, 
considerable attention is paid to the research that has focused on the consistency of wage levels 
within organizations. 
Lepak and Snell (2002) used data from 148 publicly traded companies in order to 
compare how HRM practices were used when managing groups of employees that contributed in 
different ways to organizational competitiveness. The results showed that the implementation of 
HRM systems varied across groups with different value and uniqueness to the firm.  
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Lepak, Taylor, Tekleab, Marrone, and Cohen (2007) empirically tested whether the 
implementation of high-involvement HRM systems within firms was always greater for core 
employees in comparison with support workers. The authors found no evidence in favor of this 
hypothesis, while their results revealed that the industry sector influenced the use of high-
involvement HRM systems for the two groups of workers in comparative terms. 
Melian-Gonzalez and Verano-Tacoronte (2004, 2006) used questionnaire information 
obtained from human resource managers in Spanish companies to compare the application of best 
human resource practices for four groups of employees. The results showed significant 
differences among groups, which contradicts the universalistic approach to HRM.  
We now turn to the examination of studies that analyze the consistency of pay levels 
across groups of workers within organizations. Exploring United States data on wage structures 
taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Groshen and Krueger (1990) found the existence of an 
important correlation among groups of workers within hospitals.  
Bronars and Famulari (1997) used data on white collar workers from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics in order to analyze variation in wages within and across establishments. The authors 
noted the existence of positive and significant correlation coefficients between professional and 
non-professional workers across establishments.. 
Cardoso (2000) examined the uniformity of pay levels in Portuguese firms using 
information on very contrasting occupations. Controlling for workers’ human capital 
characteristics, the hypothesis of the existence of a consistent pay level within firms was 
supported by the empirical results.  
A more recent study by Gerlach and Stephan (2006) investigated the stability of wages 
among occupations. Their results supported the consistency of wage policies within firms, even 
after controlling for occupational and firm characteristics.  
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The occupation as a determinant of PFP use  
The main objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between the occupational 
category and the use of different systems of PFP. In order to do so, we examine the attributes of 
an occupational group that could influence the adoption of incentives systems. Drawing on the 
agency theory and the literature on the PFP determinants, we focus on the following features of 
an occupational group: measurability of performance, risk attitudes, information asymmetries, 
degree of autonomy, variety of tasks, teamwork and co-operation, and influence on the 
performance of the establishment. 
A necessary condition for the use of PFP as an incentive mechanism is that the 
performance of an employee can be measured (Prendergast 1999). The nature of the work 
deployed by an occupational group of workers affects the ease of measurement of their 
performance and, as a consequence, it influences the possibility of adopting PFP. In other words, 
it will be more likely that an employer adopts PFP when worker’s performance can be observed. 
Besides the measurability of performance, there are other attributes that could influence the use 
of PFP schemes. The standard agency model assumes risk neutrality for the principal but risk 
aversion on the agent’s part (Gibbons and Waldman 1999). Following this idea, one can derive 
that risk tolerant workers will receive PFP with a higher frequency than those employees less 
willing to take risks. Given that there might be a correlation between occupational choice and the 
worker’s risk aversion (Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde 2007), the latter variable 
should be taken into consideration when analyzing the diffusion of PFP systems across 
occupations. Information asymmetries between workers and employers result in agency costs for 
the latter. The extent of these information asymmetries may vary depending on the nature of the 
job, so they are also an attribute worth considering when analyzing occupational differences in 
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the use of PFP. Another relevant attribute is workers’ autonomy. Autonomy exacerbates the 
moral hazard problem, which might be reduced through incentive provision (see Holmstrom 
1979). More precisely, it is argued that the adoption of IPFP is more likely when the autonomy of 
workers is high (Barth, Bratsberg, Hægeland, and Raaum 2008). For those employees who work 
in teams, individual performance may be difficult to measure. As a consequence, the systems that 
link pay to collective performance may be well suited when teamwork and co-operation among 
workers are required (Jirjahn 2002). A similar argument can be applied to those jobs 
characterized by a variety of tasks. When different tasks need to be remunerated, it is difficult to 
find an individual measure that reflects overall performance (Jirjahn and Stephan 2004). Under 
these circumstances, GPFP and FPFP will be used more likely. Finally, the influence of a 
worker’s job on the performance of the establishment is also an attribute worth considering. For 
certain occupations, organizational performance is very sensitive to individual effort, and this 
may favor the use of plant or firm level incentives as a motivation device (Ortin-Angel and Salas-
Fumas 1998).  
The occupations included in our study present differences regarding the attributes 
described above. In order to obtain information on these attributes we use two main sources. The 
first one is the Occupational Outlook Handbook (U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012), a 
publication of the United States Department of Labor that describes what workers do on the job, 
their working conditions, the training and education needed, the earnings, and the expected job 
prospects for a wide range of occupations. The second one is the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations (International Labour Office 2008) published by the International 
Labour Organization. This classification presents information on occupational categories using a 
classification system based on the skills needed to perform the job.  
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The first group of workers analyzed in this study is the top executives. The type of work 
performed by this occupation is characterized by a substantive degree of autonomy and the 
combination of a variety of tasks. According to the Occupational Outlook Handbook, top 
executives are in charge of the design of the strategies and policies necessary to achieve the 
objectives of the organization. Given that top executives have substantial discretion in the way 
they perform their job and a high degree of responsibility in the organization, we expect that the 
workers hired for this type of position show a high willingness to take risks. The tasks performed 
by the different top executives that compound an organization are interdependent, so teamwork 
and co-ordination are also required (Main, O’Reilly III, and Wade 1993). Regarding qualification 
needs, top executive positions usually demand high education and experience, as well as specific 
skills such as leadership, confidence or ability to communicate effectively.  
Taking all these features into account, we expect that top executives receive PFP with a 
high frequency. The variety and complexity of tasks carried out by top executives as well as their 
substantive autonomy and empowerment suggest that it will be difficult to monitor their effort. In 
addition, they are expected to be less risk averse than workers occupying lower positions in the 
organizational hierarchy. According to the arguments presented at the beginning of the section, 
we expect that the job autonomy is associated with IPFP. Moreover, the variety of tasks carried 
out by these employees suggests that they will receive collective pay systems such as group and 
firm incentives (Jirjahn 2002). As we have mentioned, teamwork and co-operation are also 
required in top executive positions, which reinforces the idea that they will be remunerated using 
GPFP. Finally, their performance has a strong influence on the results obtained by the 
establishment, so we expect to observe a high incidence of plant or firm incentives for this 
occupational category.  
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Middle managers are in charge of the planning, control and co-ordination of production 
teams. They monitor production and set programs to supervise the quality of output. According to 
the Occupational Outlook Handbook, they collaborate with other managers in order to put into 
practice the policies of the organization. Mid-level qualifications and a considerable experience 
are commonly needed. Taking into account all these attributes, we hypothesize that middle 
managers will be frequently remunerated using PFP. The degree of autonomy required to perform 
this job suggests that it is likely that middle managers receive pay for individual results. 
However, the work carried out by middle managers might be difficult to measure in individual 
terms due to features already described, such as their various managerial duties. Therefore, it is 
possible that they receive pay linked to subjective rather than objective measures of individual 
performance determined by managers at a higher level. Alternatively, their pay could be based on 
measures of collective performance. From the agency theory perspective, we expect that the use 
of FPFP is lower for middle managers than its adoption for top executives. The reason is that the 
connection between effort and establishment performance is less straightforward as we move 
down the organizational hierarchy (O’Shaughnessy 1998). As O’Shaughnessy (1998) points out, 
other collective pay schemes such as GPFP could be more useful when trying to motivate these 
workers. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the middle managers’ job consists of a set of 
different tasks and they need to co-operate with other managers and heads of departments.  
Professional workers carry out functions that contribute to the fulfillment of the objectives 
of the different organizational areas. They are involved in activities such as developing 
operational methods, gathering information on competitors, goods and services, assessing 
customer needs or designing and implementing recruitment and training programs. The 
qualification requirements of the group are high: according to the International Standard 
Classification of Occupations, they belong to the highest skill categories. To the extent that their 
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contribution is relevant for organizational success and the creation of a competitive advantage, 
they will be frequently managed using incentive pay. As a consequence, we expect that they 
receive FPFP, although the frequency will be probably lower than the one observed for top 
managers. Moreover, the significant degree of autonomy of professionals over their work points 
to a high incidence of IPFP for this occupation. However, information asymmetries may exist 
between professionals and their managers, giving rise to agent opportunism. If this is the case, the 
use of IPFP might be low for this type of workers due to existing contractual difficulties. Hence, 
the adoption of this particular system cannot be precisely anticipated.  
One of the categories that compound an industrial establishment is the group of 
administrative workers. The functions carried out by this occupation mainly consist in clerical 
duties, support tasks and information management. The administrative functions are commonly 
standardized and well determined. As a result, they enjoy low autonomy regarding the tasks 
performed, the pace of work or the planning and organization of their duties. Experience and 
basic administrative skills are valued but not essential, since it is possible to learn on the job. 
Administrative workers do not work in teams or need to co-operate with other employees with a 
high frequency. Moreover, their direct contribution to organizational performance is not clearly 
identifiable, since they are devoted to support the work of other occupational groups. All these 
circumstances suggest that they will be managed using complex HRM practices such as PFP with 
a lower probability than the rest of occupations mentioned. When remunerated using incentives, 
the individualistic nature of these jobs makes us think that they will receive IPFP. On the 
contrary, we do not expect to find a high incidence of GPFP and FPFP for administrative 
workers. 
Sales employees promote and sale the merchandise of the establishment. They may also 
be in charge of other activities such as preparing reports or analyzing statistics. There are no 
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specific qualification or experience requirements for these positions, but certain skills such as 
interpersonal relations or the ability to sell products are needed. The nature of their job promotes 
the adoption of PFP, since the performance of sales workers is easily identifiable. Moreover, they 
spend part of their working hours outside the establishment, which gives rise to information 
asymmetries. The ease of measurement of individual performance suggests that PFP for sales 
workers will be mostly linked to their individual performance. Attributes such as a variety and 
complexity of tasks or a strong link with organizational performance are not observed for sales 
workers. Consequently, it is not likely that they receive compensation schemes that link their pay 
to group, plant or firm performance.  
Finally, production workers perform manual tasks related to fabrication, assembling or 
operating machinery, among others. They participate in routine activities and their work is 
determined by the nature of the production process. As a result, production employees have low 
freedom to influence their productivity levels and the course of their work in comparison with 
occupations at higher hierarchical positions. According to agency theory, optimal incentives are 
low powered when performance is not excessively sensitive to changes in effort. In addition, the 
type of job effected by production workers enables direct monitoring by a supervisor or 
straightforward appraisal due to the nature of the production process, thus reducing the need for 
alternative incentive mechanisms. In light of these features, we do not expect to find a high 
incidence of PFP for this occupation. However, production workers have been traditionally 
remunerated using piece rates, a particular type of IPFP. The reason for this might be that their 
performance is easily measured individually due to the nature of production.  
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Size, foreign ownership and HR department  
Besides the occupational group, there are other variables that may influence the adoption 
of PFP systems at the establishment level. In particular, structural contingency theory posits that 
the adoption of human resource practices by an organization depends on its contingencies (Delery 
and Doty 1996). This theory broke away from the universalistic perspective, which holds that 
there is only one effective way to organize. On the basis of this theory, it may be inferred that the 
design of PFP systems responds to strategic pay concerns. There is a significant body of research 
analyzing the determinants of the adoption of PFP systems using establishment data. Taking into 
account this research, we can gain an insight into the contingency factors that have an effect on 
the use of PFP. In particular, it has been shown that establishment size, membership in a 
multinational company and the existence of a HR department may influence the employer’s 
decision to adopt PFP plans.  
Regarding the impact of the size of the establishment, this variable might influence both 
the probability of using PFP and the type of scheme adopted. On the one hand, the fixed costs of 
implementing a PFP system are spread over more employees when the establishment is large, 
supporting the idea that the likelihood of implementing such a system will increase with the size 
of the establishment. Moreover, large establishments more frequently own or have access to the 
technology and knowledge necessary to develop PFP (Long and Shields 2005). On the other 
hand, there is a free rider problem associated with the use of group incentives, a problem that is 
exacerbated as the size of the establishment increases (Hansen 1997). Therefore, we can expect 
that the influence of the size of the establishment varies depending on the compensation system 
that we take into account. In addition, it is plausible to think that the impact of the size of the 
establishment varies across occupations. The size of the establishment is associated with the 
existence of economies of scale in the implementation of HRM practices. Turning to the 
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arguments presented before, the adoption of PFP is more likely when the fixed costs are spread 
over a high number of employees. The number of workers belonging to each occupation 
increases if the establishment has a high total number of workers. Hence, in large establishments, 
the employer can adopt a system of PFP for only one occupation and still benefit from the 
economies of scale factor. According to this idea, our intuition is that the size of the 
establishment may influence positively the differential application of contingent pay across 
occupations. 
Regarding the adoption of PFP in foreign-owned companies, multinationals operate in 
different countries, where they can encounter diverse institutional settings. Since they operate in 
dispersed locations, there is a cultural distance between the headquarters and the subsidiaries that 
may enhance the misalignment of incentives between owners and the occupational groups at the 
different branches (Roth and O’Donnell 1996). Besides this cultural distance effect, there is also 
a geographical distance between centers, so direct monitoring of workers’ performance might be 
difficult and costly. If a subsidiary or a group of subsidiaries are faced with this monitoring 
problem, they can resort to the use of PFP as an incentive mechanism. Large multinational 
companies have to coordinate across their many locations in order to achieve goal coherence and 
incentive alignment, so the use of PFP by some subsidiaries could be spread among the different 
branches of the corporation. Consequently, membership in a multinational corporation may 
promote the adoption of PFP systems.  
We also expect to find an influence of the foreign ownership on the diffusion of PFP plans 
across occupations, although this effect is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, there is a 
high incidence of high-involvement HRM practices in multinationals (Geary and Roche 2001). 
According to the best practices approach, these practices are universally beneficial for 
organizations, so this would favor a uniform adoption of PFP systems across occupations in 
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multinationals. On the other hand, since multinationals have access to extensive knowledge 
concerning HRM, they may implement more sophisticated HRM systems consisting of a 
differential adoption of HRM practices across groups of workers.  
Finally, the literature on HRM has found evidence in favor of the idea that the presence of 
a department dealing with HRM issues in an organization has a bearing on the implementation of 
HRM practices. In particular, the existence of a HR department might facilitate the adoption of 
sophisticated practices such as PFP (Shaw, Kirkbride, Tang, and Fisher 1993). This prompts the 
conclusion that the use of contingent compensation schemes will be more likely in those 
establishments where a HR department is present. The presence of a HR department could also 
influence the diffusion of PFP systems across occupations. On the one hand, the existence of a 
HR department indicates that the establishment considers human resources to be a fundamental 
assetIn other words, they will manage human resources groups paying considerable attention to 
their particular features and contributions to organizational objectives. As Brown and Heywood 
(2005) point out, the presence of HR specialists may be indicative of the need to specialize the 
tasks of managers in order to deal with particular problems. If this is the case, we can expect that 
the existence of the HR department favors a differential use of PFP plans across occupations. On 
the other hand, the HR department has also been associated with standardization and 
formalization of HRM practices (Brown and Heywood 2005). If the HRM policy adopted favors 
the standardization of practices, this can affect the adoption of PFP systems for the different 
occupational groups that constitute an establishment. Under this assumption, the presence of a 
HR department could reduce the differences in the incidence of PFP systems among occupations.  
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Methodology 
Data 
The data was gathered in 2006 through personal interviews with managers in Spanish 
manufacturing plants with fifty or more employees, and represents a unique source of 
information about a range of human resource practices in Spanish firms. Information was 
collected at the plant level, as this is the unit at which decisions about the implementation of the 
practices of interest are taken. Furthermore, knowledge of the issues included in the questionnaire 
is expected to be greater at plant level and, as a consequence, the data obtained should be more 
reliable. 
The process of development of the data base was as follows. Once the objectives and 
scope of our study were defined, and in order to properly design the questionnaire, a thorough 
examination of the literature related to the purpose of the project was carried out. With the 
information gathered, a first draft of the questionnaire was drawn up jointly by the members of 
the research group and the firm in charge of the fieldwork. The questionnaire was pre-tested in 
nine plants and then modified in several ways to come up with its final version. The data was 
drawn from personal interviews with one of the managers at the plant. It was thought that 
questions should be addressed to the general manager or to the human resource manager. In 
practice the human resource manager was the figure most frequently interviewed.  
The range of potential respondents for the purposes of the survey comprised all Spanish 
manufacturing establishments which had fifty or more employees in 2005. After stratification by 
sector, size and location, a random selection of workplaces was obtained from the Spanish 
Central Directory of Firms (Directorio Central de Empresas, DIRCE) of the Spanish National 
Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, INE), using data from 2005. The interviews 
with those managers that agreed to answer our questionnaire were performed by specially-trained 
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professionals in computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The establishments were first 
approached by letter or email, indicating the goals of the survey and including a copy of the 
questionnaire.  
A total of 2933 establishments were contacted, from which 1001 valid interviews were 
completed. This final number of interviews matched expectations regarding the size of the data 
set, yielding a response rate of 34.1 percent. The distribution of the establishments sampled 
across industrial sectors and size intervals is described in Table 11. 
{{Place Table 1 about here}} 
Regarding the specific information about incentives obtained by the questionnaire, 
managers were asked whether different systems of PFP were used for at least 50 percent of the 
employees in each of the following occupational groups (representative of the hierarchical 
structure of a typical manufacturing establishment): top executives, middle managers, 
professionals, clerical workers, salesmen and production workers. In particular, the questionnaire 
enquired about the use of general PFP and three particular systems: IPFP, GPFP and FPFP. As a 
result, we obtained data on the use of these PFP systems for six occupational categories in each 
establishment. 
Because some of the interviews did not provide information on some of the issues of 
interest, the final sample of establishments used in the estimations is between 800 and 815 (the 
number of establishments with missing variables differs according to type of PFP scheme). Since 
the main purpose of the analysis is to examine the variability of PFP schemes among both 
1In order to examine if our sample is representative of the population of Spanish manufacturing establishments with 
50 or more workers, we have performed chi-square tests. The sample is stratified by size (establishments between 50 
and 99 workers, 100 and 499 workers, and 500 or more workers) and industry (12 manufacturing sub-categories), so 
we have compared the sample and the population across size intervals and industry categories.  The results of the 
chi-square tests suggest that there are not statistically significant differences between the sample and the population 
neither for the size dimension nor for the industry dimension (p-values of 0.490 and 0.999, respectively).  
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occupations and establishments, we have pooled the data as follows. Six occupations are 
analyzed in 815 establishments, totaling 4890 observations (6 x 815). However, 390 
establishments did not have salesmen in their workforce, so the final number of observations is 
4500 (4890 – 390). 
 
Estimation method 
The dependent variable relates to the type of incentive pay system in operation for the 
majority of employees in a particular occupational group in a given establishment. Since the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logit models. The specification of our model for a 
particular PFP scheme is as follows: 
(1) )'()1(Prob 321 ijjjjjiit zxhmsLy δγbbbαm ++++++== , 
where i denotes occupation and j denotes establishment and L(-) is the logit function. The 
dependent variable yij represents whether the PFP scheme is used for 50 percent or more workers 
of occupation i in establishment j. In the model, there is an occupation-specific effect, that is, an 
effect that does not vary across establishments and accounts for any occupational impact on the 
use of PFP. Because we are interested in estimating this occupation-specific component, a 
dummy variable is included for each of the six occupations considered except the one used as a 
reference (i.e. production workers).  
The specification includes three variables representing the establishment features we want 
to register in our analysis: size of the establishment (sj), membership in a multinational 
corporation (mj), and existence of a HR department (hj). The vector xj  includes other features of 
the establishment that we want to control for in the estimations, i.e. number of competitors, 
technological change, trade union’s influence, establishment’s strategy, export propensity and 
 
 
 
19 
manufacturing sector. Note that the xj vector only includes variables that vary across plants but 
not across occupations. Finally, the number of employees in each occupational group in each 
establishment is also included, as a percentage of all employees in the sample, zij. This variable 
varies both across occupations and establishments, and is intended to control for the size of the 
occupational group in the analysis of PFP use. Group size may influence PFP adoption because 
there are fixed costs associated with the implementation of such practices for a specific 
occupation.  
We also estimate alternative specifications that include interaction terms between each 
establishment feature of interest and the occupational dummies. These specifications allow us to 
test whether the effects of establishment size, membership in a multinational corporation, and 
existence of a HR department vary across occupations. We have chosen to include the interaction 
terms of each establishment variable separately because this specification will allow us to observe 
the full effect of each group of interactions on the dependent variables. The joint estimation of the 
whole set of interactions and their interpretation could be misleading since, for example, the size-
occupation effect might be partially operating through its indirect influence on the HR 
department-occupation and the multinational-occupation effects2.  
2 The augmented versions of Equation (1) with the interaction terms are the following: 
(2) )''()1(Prob 321 jjijjjjjiit szxhmsLy ×+++++++== αθδγbbbαm  
where L(-) is the logit function and we include interactions between size and the occupational dummies, 
(3)    )''()1(Prob 321 jjijjjjjiit mzxhmsLy ×+++++++== αθδγbbbαm  
where L(-) is the logit function and we include interactions between foreign ownership and the occupational 
dummies, and 
(4)    )''()1(Prob 321 jjijjjjjiit hzxhmsLy ×+++++++== αθδγbbbαm  
where L(-) is the logit function and we include interactions between HR department and the occupational dummies. 
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Since the models include variables measured at the plant level, it is possible that the error 
terms are correlated within establishments. In order to control for this possibility, we cluster the 
errors at the plant level when estimating the different equations previously described. 
 
Variables 
In what follows, we describe the measures used in our empirical exercise (see Table 2). 
With the information provided by the questionnaire regarding PFP usage, we constructed four 
dependent variables. These variables are dichotomous and indicate whether or not general PFP, 
IPFP, GPFP, and FPFP are used for 50 percent or more workers of a particular occupation in an 
establishment.  
{{Place Table 2 about here}} 
Regarding the independent variables, they can be grouped into two categories that 
correspond to the theoretical approaches cited in the first sections of the paper. First, we include 
six dummies representing the different occupations mentioned in previous sections. With these 
dummies, we want to test the predictions of agency theory, that is, whether or not a different 
implementation of PFP systems between occupations is observed. We also include variables that 
correspond to the idea of strategic pay and represent the features of the establishment we want to 
account for, i.e. plant size, foreign ownership and existence of a HR department. Establishment 
size is measured by means of three size-range dummies: 50-99, 100-499, and 500 or more. 
Respondents of the questionnaire were asked whether the plant was part of a multinational 
corporation. From this question, we derived the variable Multinational, which equals one if the 
establishment is foreign-owned, and zero otherwise. Managers were also asked about the 
presence of a specific department dealing with HR issues in the organization. Using their 
 
 
 
21 
responses, we created the variable HR Department, taking value one if such department exists 
and zero if it does not.  
A set of control variables is also included in the analysis. First, we take into account the 
age of the establishment, which has been singled out as a potential determinant of the adoption of 
PFP. According to Stinchcombe (1965), the practices adopted by an organization depend to a 
great extent on the resources available when that organization is founded, and they only change 
in times of crisis. Hence, an establishment might use PFP depending on its age, which reflects the 
resources that were available at the moment the plant was created. In particular, it is possible that 
age captures different cohorts of beliefs about ‘best practice’. The effect of establishment age is 
measured by means of three age-range dummies: less than 20 years, 20-39, and 40 or more.  
The degree of competition in the product market could also have a bearing on the use of 
PFP schemes. In particular, intense competition may promote the use of PFP as a means of 
controlling labor costs (Drago and Heywood 1995; Heywood, Huebler, and Jirjahn 1998; Barth et 
al. 2008). On the other hand, Bayo-Moriones and Huerta-Arribas (2002) find a negative 
correlation between intensified competition and the use of production incentives in Spain. The 
interviewees evaluated the degree of competition in the market where the establishment operates. 
Using this information, we constructed an ordinal-scale variable ranging from value one (no 
competitors) to value five (many competitors).  
Technological change may also influence the use of PFP. In particular, it causes a revision 
in pay systems and brings uncertainty to profits (Heywood and Wei 1997; Heywood et al. 1998). 
Consequently, it is expected that this factor makes the use of certain types of incentives less 
likely. A questionnaire item provided information about the extent of technological change in the 
establishment. Specifically, respondents were asked whether, during the three previous years, 
there were no technological changes in the establishment, minor changes, significant changes, 
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major changes, or a complete change of the production system. Using this information, we 
constructed the ordinal variable Technological Change ranging from one (no changes) to five 
(total change).  
It is commonly believed that unions oppose the introduction of PFP systems (Heywood, 
Siebert, and Wei 1997). However, and according to the empirical evidence, the influence of 
unions seems to vary with the type of PFP scheme considered (Long and Shields 2005; Barth et 
al. 2008). Questionnaire respondents were asked to evaluate the influence of unions on the 
establishment on a scale from one (very low influence) to five (very high influence).  
Business strategy may also shape the use of incentive pay by establishments, since it is 
related to the prevalence of certain forms of compensation (Drago and Heywood 1995). One of 
the questions included in the survey examines the strategic priority of the plant. Accordingly, we 
include four binary variables in the analysis corresponding to cost, quality, flexibility, and 
innovation.  
The percentage of sales exported to international markets is also considered to be a 
relevant determinant of PFP adoption. Long and Shields (2005) find a positive influence of the 
propensity to export on the incidence of PFP, and suggest that this relationship may be due to the 
fact that exporting firms use incentive schemes in order to improve their productivity and 
compete in an international context. We include in the analysis a variable that represents the 
percentage of exports out of the total sales of the establishment.  
Finally, features of the production process could also shape the use of PFP. Previous 
studies have taken this into account and introduced industry controls in their analyses (Long and 
Shields 2005; Barth et al. 2008; among others). We consider twelve dummy variables 
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representing manufacturing subcategories in order to account for industry specificities3. In 
addition, we use the variable Occupational Percentage to control for the percentage of workers in 
the occupational group under consideration over the total number of employees in the 
establishment. 
 
Results  
Preliminary analysis 
Before estimating the equations of interest, we examine the incidence of PFP for each 
occupational category of workers (see Table 3). In the first column of the table, we observe that 
sales employees is the group that most frequently receives PFP (63 percent of workplaces in our 
final sample), followed by top executives (54.9 percent of workplaces), middle managers (44 
percent of workplaces) and professional workers (42.4 percent of workplaces). Production 
workers (31 percent of workplaces) and administrative workers (25 percent of workplaces) close 
this classification. The use of IPFP reproduces the same pattern, with sales workers in the top 
position (49.3 percent of workplaces) and administrative workers coming in last place (14.2 
percent of workplaces). In the case of GPFP, the ranking of occupations differs from that of the 
previous scheme: the top executives occupation shows the highest frequency of GPFP use (15.3 
percent of workplaces). However, our data reveals that there are not large differences in the 
percentage of workplaces using GPFP for the different occupations, with figures that vary 
between 15.3 percent for top executives and 11.4 percent for sales workers. The administrative 
workers category is an exception in this regard, displaying a very low diffusion of this scheme 
(6.9 percent of workplaces). As far as FPFP is concerned, it should be noted that the use of this 
3 The manufacturing subcategories taken into account are the ones displayed in Table 1. 
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system is greater for high-level occupations and diminishes for workers lower on the hierarchical 
scale. Hence, top executives is the occupation with the highest incidence of this pay scheme (27.2 
percent of workplaces), followed by professionals (17.7 percent of workplaces), middle managers 
(16.2 percent of workplaces) and sales workers (14.0 percent of workplaces). At the lower end of 
the classification are administrative (10.2 percent of workplaces) and production workers (9.7 
percent of workplaces).  
{{Place Table 3 about here}} 
Table 4 provides a descriptive portrait of the intra-establishment diffusion of the different 
PFP schemes. This table displays the percentages of establishments providing PFP for zero to six 
occupations.4 The general pattern we observe is that very few establishments use PFP schemes 
for most of the occupations, and the schemes that link pay to collective performance are 
especially rare. 
{{Place Table 4 about here}} 
 
Regression results  
In what follows, the results of the empirical analysis are described. Tables 5 to 8 present 
the results of the regressions for the general use of PFP as well as the three particular systems 
analyzed. Each table includes the estimations of five logit models with standard errors clustered 
at the establishment level. In Model 1 we exclude from the analysis those variables that are 
potentially endogenous. We use this specification in order to observe the total effect of the 
exogenous regressors on the use of PFP, thus facilitating the interpretation of the results. In 
4 Since the percentage of establishments using performance pay for five and six occupations is very low, we have 
grouped both categories into one. This reduced percentage is in part due to the fact that some establishments do not 
have any salesman among their workers (396 establishments). 
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addition, it is possible that there are underlying factors leading to the determination of both the 
dependent variable and one of these potentially endogenous variables. This may be observed in 
relation to the setting up of a HR department and the use of PFP, since both variables may be 
jointly driven by unmeasured factors. Hence, establishments concerned about the importance of 
efficient human resources management could choose to create a HR department and implement 
high performance practices such as PFP. It could also be the case that employers have to deal 
with problems of internal control, so they establish a department with specialists in human 
resources and use PFP as a way of improving the internal control issue. The second model 
accounts for the occupational dummies and all the establishment characteristics as explanatory 
variables, and the other three models include the interactions between the occupational variables 
and size of the establishment (Model 3), membership in a multinational company (Model 4) and 
existence of a HR department (Model 5). In order to link the description of the results with the 
theoretical approaches to the use of PFP, each table and model displays, first, the set of 
occupational dummies in the first place (which are used to test the predictions of agency theory); 
second; the variables related to strategic pay; and third, the control variables. 
We begin by examining the predictions of agency theory. In order to do so, we look at the 
occupational dummies included in Tables 5 to 8, as well as the Wald tests of equality reported in 
Table 9. Regarding the use of any PFP (see Table 5), Model 1 shows that the estimated effects for 
the occupational dummies are all highly significant and, with the exception of the administrative 
workers category, of a positive sign. These results are replicated in the second model, with the 
only exception that the administratives effect loses significance. The high significance of the 
results supports the idea that occupation is a relevant determinant of PFP use, thus backing up the 
predictions of the agency theory presented in the previous sections of the paper. The sign of the 
marginal effects indicates that, with the exception of administrative employees, the remaining 
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occupations have a higher probability of receiving PFP in comparison with production workers. 
Regarding the magnitude of the results, we observe that sales workers are around 38 per cent 
more likely to receive PFP than production workers. They are followed by the top executives 
category, which displays a probability of 30 per cent in comparison with the reference group. 
Finally, the professional and middle manager workers are 17.9 and 19.6 per cent more likely to 
be paid for performance with respect to production employees.  
{{Place Table 5 about here}} 
In order to gain more insight into the influence of the occupational variables, Wald tests 
of equality between pairs of occupations were carried out (see Table 9). With these tests, we want 
to assess whether there are statistically significant differences between the estimated effects for 
the five white collar occupations considered in our analysis. The first column of Table 9 displays 
the results of the tests corresponding to the general use of PFP. As may be observed, the statistics 
are mostly highly significant, which reinforces the hypothesis that the implementation of PFP 
schemes varies across groups of workers. According to the results shown in the table, sales 
workers is the white collar occupation with highest use of PFP, followed by top executives. On 
the other hand, the administrative workers group is the one with lowest adoption of PFP, since we 
observe that all white collar occupations have a higher probability of using general PFP in 
comparison with this group of workers. Finally, there are no significant differences in the 
adoption of PFP between professionals and middle managers.  
When we examine the results obtained for IPFP, we observe that they are similar to those 
obtained for the use of any PFP (see Table 6). With the exception of administrative workers, the 
occupational dummies are highly significant and of a positive sign. Again, the estimations show 
that white collar workers, with the exception of the administrative group, are more likely to be 
remunerated using IPFP in comparison with blue collar employees. According to Model 2, being 
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a sales worker increases the probability of receiving this particular pay scheme by 34 percent, 
whereas top executives are 20 per cent more likely to be paid for individual performance in 
comparison with production workers. The large marginal effect displayed by sales workers may 
confirm the results of the preliminary analysis, which showed a high incidence of IPFP for this 
occupation. The estimated effects for professionals and middle managers are slightly above 10 
percentage points with respect to the reference group.  
{{Place Table 6 about here}} 
Turning to the results of Table 9, the differences between white collar occupations are 
also statistically significant with the exception of the professionals-middle managers pair. 
According to the table, sales workers are the employees who are most likely to receive IPFP, 
followed by top executives. In this case, the difference between the coefficients of both 
occupations is higher in comparison with the difference observed for the use of any PFP plan (see 
Tables 5 and 6). Finally, the coefficients of all white collar occupations are higher than the 
coefficient obtained for administrative workers. Overall, the results shown in Tables 6 and 9 
provide further support for the implications of agency theory, that is, the differential use of PFP 
between occupations due to work organization concerns. 
Regarding the use of pay linked to group results (see Table 7), these are also in line with 
the ideas derived from agency theory, although in this case the effects of the occupation variables 
are weaker compared to their incidence on the pay schemes previously described. Top executives 
and middle managers display a higher probability of receiving GPFP in comparison with 
production workers (7.0 and 6.0 percentage points, respectively). For the rest of the occupations, 
the marginal effects estimates do not show any significant effect on the dependent variable. The 
lower incidence of the occupational variables on the use of this pay scheme could be explained 
by its scant diffusion in the Spanish manufacturing industry. The Wald tests displayed in the third 
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column of Table 9 confirm that not all the coefficients estimated for the white collar occupations 
are statistically different from one another. An interesting result is that the differences between 
administrative workers and the other categories are always significant, which backs up the idea 
that the pattern of adoption of PFP for this occupation differs notably from the pattern shown by 
the other groups. 
{{Place Table 7 about here}} 
As far as FPFP is concerned, the results do not differ substantially from the ones that have 
already been described (see Table 8). All the occupational categories except administrative 
workers are more likely to be remunerated using FPFP than blue collar employees. According to 
Model 2, the magnitude of the marginal effects is higher for the top executives’ category, which 
displays a 20 per cent higher probability of receiving this pay scheme than production workers. 
This result is in line with the one disclosed by the preliminary analysis of the incidence of PFP 
across occupations. The magnitudes of the results for the rest of occupations support the idea that 
the use of this system is greater for high-level occupations and diminishes for workers lower on 
the hierarchical scale. Looking at the tests reported in the fourth column of Table 9, we observe 
that the top executives’ category is the white collar group with a higher probability of receiving 
FPFP. This result is related to the findings of O’Shaughnessy (1998), who found support for the 
fact that the effort of CEOs is more directly connected with the performance of the organization 
and, consequently, it is more likely that they receive FPFP than workers at lower levels in the 
hierarchy. With just one exception, the tests of the differences between coefficients are always 
statistically significant, which supports the importance of occupation as a determinant of FPFP 
adoption. 
{{Place Table 8 about here}} 
{{Place Table 9about here}} 
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We now focus on the predictions derived from the strategic pay approach. Looking at the 
second set of explanatory variables included in Model 1 of Table 5, the analysis reveals that the 
use of PFP is higher in establishments of medium and large size in comparison with small plants. 
According to Model 2, only those establishments with 100 to 499 workers have a significantly 
different probability of using PFP of any kind. In particular, they are around a 9 per cent more 
likely to adopt PFP than small plants. These findings could indicate that, as the size of the 
establishment increases, the employer has more resources to develop and manage PFP systems. It 
is also possible that medium and large plants are more likely to adopt PFP because the costs of 
implementation can be spread across a higher number of employees. Regression results identify a 
positive and highly significant effect of the multinational variable, which is consistent with the 
idea that foreign-owned companies have a tendency to resort to the types of compensation 
schemes under study. Finally, the HR department variable also correlates positively and 
significantly with the use of PFP, supporting the hypothesis that the presence of a department 
dealing with HR promotes the adoption of more sophisticated practices such as PFP. The results 
obtained for this set of variables show that, besides the importance of agency theory in 
endeavoring to account for the adoption of PFP, the use of these compensation systems is also led 
by strategic pay concerns. 
The inclusion of the interaction terms (Models 3, 4 and 5) does not substantially change 
the results displayed in Model 2. However, two interesting outcomes are worth noticing regarding 
the influence of the top executives occupation. First, Model 2 shows that, when we include the 
interactions between the size and occupations variables, the former regressor is no longer 
significant for the excluded occupation category. On the contrary, the findings show that top 
executives are more likely to receive PFP in plants of a medium size than in small establishments. 
This result could be related to the fact that, since occupational groups are more numerous as the 
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number of workers increases, the employer can make a differential use of PFP systems across 
occupations. Then, we find evidence in favor of the idea that the effect of the establishment size 
on the use of PFP varies across occupations within the same organization. Second, when we 
include the interaction terms between foreign ownership and the occupational categories in the 
analysis, we observe that it is more likely that top executives receive PFP in establishments that 
are part of a multinational corporation in comparison with domestically-owned companies. This 
result could be explained by the fact that multinationals have extensive knowledge on HRM 
issues, so they can make a differential use of PFP across occupations. In our data set, this 
argument is only observed for the top executives whereas for the rest of groups we do not find a 
significant influence of the multinational variable on the diffusion of PFP across occupations5.  
It is also worth mentioning that the effects of the exogenous variables do not significantly 
change whether or not we include the potentially endogenous in the analysis. This result gives 
additional support to the fact that our exogenous variables have direct effects on the dependent 
variable. 
When we look at the estimations depicted in Model 2 of Table 6, the likelihood of 
adopting IPFP increases in medium-sized establishments by 4.7 percentage points in comparison 
with those of a small size, whereas its use in large plants is not statistically different from its 
adoption in small establishments. Foreign ownership promotes the use of this particular pay 
scheme, whereas the HR department variable does not emerge as a significant determinant of the 
5 We have also estimated the probability of using pay for performance of any kind including the three sets of 
interactions in the same model. The magnitude of the marginal effects, their signs and significance levels are similar 
to those reported in Table 6. Using this specification, we have tested the joint significance of the three sets of 
interactions as well as the joint significance of the interactions between size and occupation, multinational and 
occupation, and HR department and occupation. According to the results, all interactions are jointly significant at the 
0.01 level (χ2 = 49.41). The interactions between size and occupation are also jointly significant at the 0.05 level (χ2 
=21.63), and the same occurs with the interactions between multinational and occupation (χ2 =13.43). The set of 
interactions between HR department and occupation are not statistically significant. 
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use of IPFP. When the first set of interactions (Model 3) is included, the interaction effects 
between the top executive and the size dummies emerge as positive and statistically significant. 
As we have already mentioned, it is plausible to think that the size of the establishment facilitates 
a differential use of IPFP across occupations, so that top executives are more likely to be 
remunerated using this particular scheme. The evidence of the interaction effect of top executives 
and foreign ownership is also statistically significant at the 0.10 level. Apart from this two results 
related to the influence of top executives, none of the interactions taken into account in the 
analysis displays a significant incidence on the dependent variable6.  
Turning to the analysis of the next pay scheme, the use of GPFP increases with the size of 
the establishment (by 3 and 6.6 percentage points in medium and large plants, respectively, in 
comparison with small establishments), the membership in a multinational corporation (5.9 per 
cent) and the existence of a HR department (6.1 per cent). These findings provide further 
confidence that the adoption of GPFP depends on the strategic needs of the organization. 
Moreover, only one of the interaction terms emerges as a significant determinant in our estimated 
equations7. 
Finally, the findings presented in Table 8 for the use of FPFP are consistent with the 
predictions of the strategic pay approach. Model 2 shows that the probability of using this pay 
system increases in medium and large size establishments, in contrast to small plants. Being a 
multinational company also has a positive impact on the adoption of FPFP. Furthermore, the 
6  We have also estimated an additional model for the use pay for individual performance in which we include the 
three sets of interactions at a time. The results are not significantly different from those reported in Table 7. For this 
particular system, all interactions are jointly significant at the 0.05 level (χ2 = 36.65). The interactions between size 
and occupation are also jointly significant at the 0.10 level (χ2 =17.99), whereas the interactions between 
multinational and occupation and HR department and occupation do not emerge as statistically significant in this 
particular specification. 
7 When we estimate the determinants of this model including the three sets of interactions at a time, we find that 
neither the whole set of interactions nor the interactions between each of the establishment variables and the 
occupation dummies are statistically significant.  
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presence of a department dealing with human resources increases the likelihood of adopting 
FPFP by 9 percentage points8. Most of the interaction effects between the occupational dummies 
and the contingent factors are not statistically significant. The only exceptions are the interaction 
Sales worker-Large size interaction, and the Professional-Multinational and Middle manager-
Multinational pairs. 
Overall, we observe that the results of the empirical analysis are in line with both the 
agency and the strategic pay approaches to the use of PFP. On the contrary, we do not find 
support for the idea of universality derived from the best practices, economies of scale, 
bargaining or institutional theories. 
 
Conclusions  
In this study, we have analyzed the diffusion of PFP systems across occupational groups 
of workers using a Spanish sample of manufacturing establishments. More specifically, we have 
explored three theoretical approaches to PFP: agency theory, which predicts differences in the 
use of PFP across occupations; strategic pay, which links the design of PFP to contingency 
factors; and the idea that certain work practices are uniformly applied to the entire workforce 
within an organization regardless of the occupation and organization features. 
In relation to agency theory, the empirical analysis has revealed that occupation is a 
significant factor in explaining the incidence of PFP schemes, which supports the idea of 
differentiation in PFP design due to work organization. As far as the comparison among 
occupations is concerned, we have identified certain patterns of PFP implementation. Sales 
8 In the specification that includes all the interactions, none of the sets of interaction terms emerge as significant in 
the analysis of pay for plant or firm performance. 
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workers constitute the group with a greater coverage of PFP, followed closely by top executives. 
The use of PFP for the sales workers occupation is mainly concentrated on IPFP, whereas top 
executives stand out as an important determinant of FPFP. Professional workers and middle 
managers follow a similar pattern regarding the use of the various schemes of PFP, being 
remunerated using PFP with a considerable frequency. On the other hand, production and 
administrative workers are the categories that display a lower incidence of PFP. Finally, and with 
the exception of administrative workers, those groups that can be classified as white collar (i.e. 
top executives, professionals, middle managers and sales workers) are, in general, more likely to 
receive PFP in comparison with blue collar workers. This outcome supports the existence of 
clusters of occupations, white collar versus blue collar, which receive similar compensation 
systems (Cardoso 2000). 
In addition to the significance of the occupational variables, the findings confirm that the 
design of PFP plans is also led by strategic pay concerns. This is inferred from the important role 
played by the size of the establishment, the membership in a multinational company and the 
existence of a HR department as determinants of PFP use. Overall, the three variables exert a 
positive and highly significant effect on the use of these kinds of pay plans. On the contrary, the 
idea of a universal application of HRM practices across occupations does not find support in our 
empirical analysis.  
It is worth mentioning that other interpretations could also contribute to explaining the 
differences in the use of PFP across occupations. One of these interpretations is the possibility 
that there are collective agreements operating in the establishment that cover workers in certain 
occupations (for example, agreements applied to blue collar workers but not white collar 
employees). To the extent that collective agreements influence the HRM practices adopted by 
employers, they could lead to differences in PFP between occupations. Another relevant 
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approach might be occupational licensing. When quality of service is to be enhanced, the 
employer can resort to contingent pay. However, if these types of contracts are difficult to 
implement, they might be substituted by licensing (Shapiro 1986). Consequently, occupational 
licensing provisions could also be a source of inter-occupational variation in the use of PFP.   
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Table 1. Size and Sector Distribution of the Establishments in the Sample 
Manufacturing Sector 50 to 99 workers 
100 to 499 
workers 
500 or more 
workers TOTAL 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 75 70 11 156 
Textile Industry, Wearing Apparel, Leather and 
Footwear 44 24 1 69 
Wood and Cork 14 20 0 34 
Paper, Editing and Graphic Design 32 31 6 69 
Chemical Industry 29 47 4 80 
Rubber and Plastic Products 29 34 5 68 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 53 50 5 108 
Metallurgy and Fabricated Mechanical Products 85 63 6 154 
Machinery and Mechanical Equipment 39 34 2 75 
Electrical, Electronic and Optical Products and 
Equipment 31 36 4 71 
Transport Equipment 15 37 8 60 
Other Manufacturing Industries 38 18 1 57 
TOTAL 484 464 53 1001 
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Table 2. Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
Deviation 
PFP 1 if any system of PFP is used for 50 percent or more workers; 0 otherwise. 0.421 0.494 
IPFP 1 if any system of IPFP is used for 50 percent or more workers; 0 otherwise. 0.260 0.439 
GPFP 1 if any system of GPFP is used for 50 percent or more workers; 0 otherwise. 0.123 0.328 
FPFP 1 if any system of FPFP is used for 50 percent or more workers; 0 otherwise. 0.159 0.366 
50 to 99 employees 1 if the establishment has between 50 and 99 workers; 0 otherwise 0.484 0.500 
100 to 499 employees 1 if the establishment has between 100 and 499  workers; 0 otherwise 0.464 0.499 
500 employees or more 1 if the establishment has 500 workers or more; 0 otherwise 0.053 0.224 
Multinational 1 if the establishment is part of a multinational corporation; 0 otherwise 0.213 0.409 
HR Department 1 if there is a department at the establishment or firm that deals with HRM issues; 
0 otherwise. 
0.712 0.453 
Less than 20  years 1 if the establishment has an age of less than 20 years; 0 otherwise 0.264 0.441 
20 to 39 years 1 if the establishment has an age between 20 and 39 years; 0 otherwise 0.392 0.488 
40 years or more 1 if the establishment has an age of 40 years or more; 0 otherwise 0.344 0.475 
Number of competitors 
 
1 if there are no competitors in the product market; 2 if there are few competitors 
in the product market; 3 if there are quite a few competitors in the product market; 
4 if there are many competitors in the product market 
3.120 0.770 
Technological change 
 
1 if there has not been any significant technological change in the establishment 
during the last three years; 2 if there has been a minor technological change in the 
establishment during the last three years; 3 if there has been a important 
technological change in the establishment during the last three years; 4 if there has 
been a very significant technological change in the establishment during the last 
three years; 5 if the production process has totally changed during the last three 
years 
2.624 1.184 
Union influence 
 
1 if trade unions have a very low influence over production workers; 2 if trade 
unions have a low influence over production workers; 3 if trade unions have a 
medium influence over production workers; 4 if trade unions have a high influence 
over production workers; 5 if trade unions have a very high influence over 
production workers 
2.910 1.151 
Cost 1 if the strategy of the establishment if focused on the cost; 0 otherwise 0.232 0.422 
Quality 1 if the strategy of the establishment is focused on the quality; 0 otherwise 0.509 0.500 
Flexibility 1 if the strategy of the establishment if focused on the flexibility; 0 otherwise 0.137 0.344 
Innovation 1 if the strategy of the establishment is focused on the innovation; 0 otherwise 0.121 0.326 
Exports Percentage of exports over total sales 30.458 29.848 
Occupational percentage 
 
Percentage of the occupational group under consideration over total number of 
employees 
16.585 25.052 
Occupation 6 occupational categories included   
Industry 12 manufacturing categories included   
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Table 3. Percentage of Establishments using PFP for the Different Occupations 
 PFP for the majority of 
workers in the occupation 
IPFP for the majority of 
workers in the occupation 
GPFP for the majority of 
workers in the occupation 
FPFP for the majority of 
workers in the occupation 
Top executives 54.9 32.8 15.3 27.2 
Professionals 42.4 24.7 13.7 17.7 
Middle managers 44.0 25.0 14.5 16.2 
Administrative workers 25.0 14.2 6.9 10.2 
Sales workers 63.0 49.3 11.4 14.0 
Production workers 31.0 18.2 11.5 9.7 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Percentage of Establishments with PFP for One to Six Occupations 
 
General 
 
Individual 
 
Group 
 
Plant or Firm 
None occupation receives PFP 22.1 35.2 67 66.6 
One occupation receives PFP 18.3 23.4 16.7 11.9 
Two occupations receive PFP 10.5 11.4 5.6 4.8 
Three occupations receive PFP 11.1 8.9 2.9 4.0 
Four occupations receive PFP 11.8 7.9 3.7  5.6 
Five or six occupations receive PFP 26.2 13.2 4.1 7.1 
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Table 5. Determinants of PFP Use, Logit Regressions  
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Constant -2.682*** 
(.475) 
-2.682*** 
(.475) 
-2.583*** 
(.484) 
-2.700*** 
(.482) 
-2.817*** 
(.503) 
Top executive .218*** 
(.020) 
.305*** 
(.047) 
.238*** 
(.054) 
.293*** 
(.050) 
.289*** 
(.062) 
Professional .105*** 
(.020) 
.179*** 
(.044) 
.162*** 
(.051) 
.193*** 
(.048) 
.202*** 
(.060) 
Middle manager .118*** 
(.019) 
.196*** 
(.046) 
.185*** 
(.052) 
.205*** 
(.050) 
.241*** 
(.062) 
Administrative -.072*** 
(.020) 
-.002 
(.045) 
-.006 
(.052) 
.002 
(.050) 
.066 
(.060) 
Sales worker .302*** 
(.023) 
.384*** 
(.048) 
.366*** 
(.055) 
.389*** 
(.051) 
.430*** 
(.063) 
100 to 499 employees .108*** 
(.023) 
.093*** 
(.026) 
.055 
(.035) 
.093*** 
(.026) 
.093*** 
(.026) 
500 employees or more .141*** 
(.048) 
.086 
(.053) 
.069 
(.072) 
.085 
(.053) 
.087 
(.053) 
Multinational .184*** 
(.027) 
.186*** 
(.029) 
.187*** 
(.029) 
.187*** 
(.040) 
.187*** 
(.029) 
HR Department - .065** 
(.029) 
.065** 
(.029) 
.065** 
(.029) 
.093** 
(.045) 
20 to 40 years .045 
(.029) 
.045 
(.030) 
.045 
(.030) 
.044 
(.030) 
.045 
(.030) 
40 years or more .029 
(.029) 
..017 
(.031) 
.017 
(.031) 
017 
(.031) 
.017 
(.031) 
Number of competitors .009 
(.015) 
.020 
(.016) 
.020 
(.016) 
.020 
(.016) 
.021 
(.016) 
Technological change - .007 
(.010) 
.007 
(.010) 
.007 
(.010) 
.007 
(.010) 
Union influence - -.007 
(.010) 
-.007 
(.010) 
-.007 
(.010) 
-.007 
(.010) 
Quality - .111*** 
(.031) 
.111*** 
(.031) 
.111*** 
(.031) 
.111*** 
(.031) 
Flexibility - .095** 
(.040) 
.095** 
(.040) 
.095** 
(.040) 
.095** 
(.040) 
Innovation - .112*** 
(.041) 
.112*** 
(.041) 
.112*** 
(.041) 
.113*** 
(.041) 
Exports - -.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.002) 
.000 
(.000) 
Occupational percentage - .001* 
(.001) 
.001* 
(.001) 
.001** 
(.001) 
.001** 
(.001) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Top executive x Medium size - - .119*** 
(.044) 
- - 
Top executive x Large size - - .194 
(.120) 
- - 
Professional x Medium size - - .022 
(.042) 
- - 
Professional x Large size - - .064 
(.105) 
- - 
Middle manager x Medium size - - .020 
(.042) 
- - 
Middle manager x Large size - - -.034 
(.090) 
- - 
Administrative x Medium size - - .012 
(.044) 
- - 
Administrative x Large size - - -.062 
(.096) 
- - 
Sales worker x Medium size - - .042 
(.052) 
- - 
Sales worker x Large size - - -.142 
(.127) 
- - 
Top executive x Multinational - - - .096* 
(.058) 
- 
Professional x Multinational - - - -.054 
(.050) 
- 
Middle manager x Multinational - - - -.025 
(.050) 
- 
Administrative x Multinational - - - -.004 
(.051) 
- 
Sales worker x Multinational - - - -.006 
(.068) 
- 
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Top executive x HR Department - - - - .032 
(.051) 
Professional x HR Department - - - - -.028 
(.050) 
Middle manager x HR Department - - - - -.058 
(.051) 
Administrative x HR Department - - - - -.089* 
(.052) 
Sales worker x HR Department - - - - -.060 
(.056) 
Chi-squared 474.96*** 448.94*** 479.19*** 457.36*** 473.39*** 
Pseudo R2 0.0888 0.1040 0.1066 0.1052 0.1053 
N 5156 4500 4500 4500 4500 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Table shows marginal effects (with standard errors clustered at the plant level in brackets) 
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Table 6. Determinants of IPFP, Logit Regressions 
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Constant -2.682*** 
(.475) 
-2.698*** 
(.509) 
-2.590*** 
(.525) 
-2.660*** 
(.518) 
-2.842*** 
(.546) 
Top executive .134*** 
(.020) 
.202*** 
(.046) 
.142*** 
(.052) 
.181*** 
(.049) 
.201 *** 
(.059) 
Professional .062*** 
(.020) 
.117*** 
(.042) 
.098* 
(.050) 
.119** 
(.047) 
.131** 
(.057) 
Middle manager .065*** 
(.020) 
.129*** 
(.045) 
.134** 
(.052) 
.123** 
(.049) 
.169*** 
(.060) 
Administrative -.058*** 
(.020) 
.005 
(.043) 
.003 
(.052) 
.002 
(.048) 
.074 
(.058) 
Sales worker .265*** 
(.021) 
.340*** 
(.046) 
.320*** 
(.053) 
.336*** 
(.049) 
.366*** 
(.060) 
100 to 499 employees .048** 
(.020) 
.047** 
(.022) 
.020 
(.034) 
.047** 
(.022) 
.047** 
(.022) 
500 employees or more .014 
(.042) 
.003 
(.048) 
-.058 
(.077) 
.002 
(.048) 
.003 
(.048) 
Multinational .159*** 
(.022) 
.175*** 
(.024) 
.175*** 
(.024) 
.153*** 
(.037) 
.176*** 
(.024) 
HR Department - .026 
(.025) 
.025 
(.025) 
.026 
(.025) 
.051 
(.041) 
20 to 40 years .047* 
(.025) 
.041 
(.027) 
.041 
(.027) 
.041 
(.027) 
.041 
(.027) 
40 years or more .056** 
(.025) 
.038 
(.027) 
.038 
(.027) 
.038 
(.027) 
.038 
(.027) 
Number of competitors .007 
(.013) 
.014 
(.014) 
.014 
(.014) 
.014 
(.014) 
.015 
(.014) 
Technological change - -.011 
(.009) 
-.011 
(.009) 
-0.011 
(.009) 
-.011 
(.009) 
Union influence - -.003 
(.009) 
-.003 
(.009) 
-.003 
(.009) 
-.002 
(.009) 
Quality - .061** 
(.027) 
.061** 
(.027) 
.061** 
(.027) 
.061** 
(.027) 
Flexibility - .062* 
(.034) 
.061* 
(.034) 
.062* 
(.034) 
.061* 
(.034) 
Innovation - .088** 
(.036) 
.089** 
(.036) 
.088** 
(.036) 
.089** 
(.036) 
Exports - .000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
Occupational percentage - .001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001* 
(.001) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Top executive x Medium size - - .095** 
(.042) 
- - 
Top executive x Large size - - .183* 
(.100) 
- - 
Professional x Medium size - - .025 
(.043) 
- - 
Professional x Large size - - .093 
(.103) 
- - 
Middle manager x Medium size - - -.016 
(.042) 
- - 
Middle manager x Large size - - .024 
(.094) 
- - 
Administrative x Medium size - - .002 
(.045 
- - 
Administrative x Large size - - .007 
(.105) 
- - 
Sales worker x Medium size - - .037 
(.045) 
- - 
Sales worker x Large size - - -.026 
(.094) 
- - 
Top executive x Multinational - - - .082* 
(.048) 
- 
Professional x Multinational - - - -.010 
(.047) 
- 
Middle manager x Multinational - - - .022 
(.047) 
- 
Administrative x Multinational - - - .011 
(.047) 
- 
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Sales worker x Multinational - - - .006 
(.053) 
- 
Top executive x HR Department - - - - .008 
(.045) 
Professional x HR Department - - - - -.016 
(.048) 
Middle manager x HR Department - - - - -.050 
(.047) 
Administrative x HR Department - - - - -.092* 
(.050) 
Sales worker x HR Department - - - - -.031 
(.049) 
Chi-squared 416.37*** 398.31*** 432.89*** 425.34*** 423.70*** 
Pseudo R2 0.0874 0.1008 0.1034 0.1018 0.1019 
N 5132 4481 4481 4481 4481 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Table shows marginal effects (with standard errors clustered at the plant level in brackets) 
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Table 7. Determinants of GPFP, Logit Regressions 
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Constant -2.682*** 
(.475) 
-3.799*** 
(.708) 
-3.837*** 
(.736) 
-3.888*** 
(.724) 
-3.944*** 
(.732) 
Top executive .030** 
(.015) 
.070* 
(.036) 
. 071 
(.043) 
.075* 
(.039) 
.055 
(.048) 
Professional . 018 
(.014) 
.049 
(.033) 
.058 
(.041) 
.065* 
(.037) 
.074 
(.045) 
Middle manager .026* 
(.014) 
.060* 
(.035) 
.065 
(.042) 
.071* 
(.039) 
.078* 
(.046) 
Administrative -.059*** 
(.015) 
-.032 
(.035) 
-.038 
(.043) 
-.028 
(.039) 
.001 
(.047) 
Sales worker .001 
(.017) 
.033 
(.037) 
.040 
(.045) 
.044 
(.041) 
.067 
(.051) 
100 to 499 employees .047*** 
(.017) 
.030* 
(.018) 
.029 
(.025) 
.030* 
(.018) 
.030* 
(.018) 
500 employees or more .094*** 
(.029) 
.066** 
(.028) 
.113*** 
(.042) 
.065** 
(.029) 
.066** 
(.029) 
Multinational .055*** 
(.028) 
.059*** 
(.019) 
.059*** 
(.019) 
.076*** 
(.026) 
.059*** 
(.019) 
HR Department - .061*** 
(.022) 
.061*** 
(.022) 
.061*** 
(.022) 
.074** 
(.033) 
20 to 40 years .032 
(.020) 
.046** 
(.022) 
.046* 
(.022) 
.046** 
(.022) 
.047** 
(.022) 
40 years or more .033 
(.021) 
.034 
(.022) 
.035 
(.022) 
.035 
(.022) 
.034 
(.022) 
Number of competitors .006 
(.010) 
.010 
(.011) 
.010 
(.011) 
.010 
(.011) 
.010 
(.011) 
Technological change - .005 
(.007) 
.005 
(.007) 
.005 
(.010) 
.005 
(.007) 
Union influence - -.010 
(.007) 
-.010 
(.007) 
-.010 
(.007) 
-.010 
(.007) 
Quality - .036* 
(.021) 
.035* 
(.021) 
.036* 
(.021) 
.036* 
(.023) 
Flexibility - .072*** 
(.026) 
.072*** 
(.026) 
.072*** 
(.026) 
.072*** 
(.026) 
Innovation - .021 
(.026) 
.021 
(.026) 
.021 
(.026) 
.021 
(.026) 
Exports - -.000 
(.000) 
.-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Occupational percentage - .001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Top executive x Medium size - - .003 
(.032) 
- - 
Top executive x Large size - - -.025 
(.061) 
- - 
Professional x Medium size - - -.007 
(.031) 
- - 
Professional x Large size - - -.073 
(.062) 
- - 
Middle manager x Medium size - - .004 
(.031) 
- - 
Middle manager x Large size - - -.101* 
(.058) 
- - 
Administrative x Medium size - - .020 
(.037) 
- - 
Administrative x Large size - - -.076 
(.077) 
- - 
Sales worker x Medium size - - -.009 
(.037) 
- - 
Sales worker x Large size - - -.029 
(.073) 
- - 
Top executive x Multinational - - - -.003 
(.345) 
- 
Professional x Multinational - - - -.049 
(.034) 
- 
Middle manager x Multinational - - - -.025 
(.033) 
- 
Administrative x Multinational - - - -.003 
(.038) 
- 
Sales worker x Multinational - - - -.025 
(.041) 
- 
Top executive x HR Department - - - - .021 
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(.038) 
Professional x HR Department - - - - -.029 
(.036) 
Middle manager x HR Department - - - - -.020 
(.036) 
Administrative x HR Department - - - - -.040 
(.039) 
Sales worker x HR Department - - - - -.040 
(.043) 
Chi-squared 141.21*** 193.90*** 209.87*** 197.34*** 145.96*** 
Pseudo R2 0.0517 0.0770 0.0785 0.0778 0.0781 
N 5097 4450 4450 4450 4450 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Table shows marginal effects (with standard errors clustered at the plant level in brackets) 
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Table 8. Determinants of FPFP, Logit Regressions  
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Constant -2.682*** 
(.475) 
-4.707*** 
(.742 
-4.725*** 
(.759) 
-4.897*** 
(.766) 
-4.667*** 
(.789) 
Top executive .162*** 
(.0017) 
.208*** 
(.038) 
.203*** 
(.044) 
.225*** 
(.043) 
.200*** 
(.053) 
Professional .088*** 
(.017) 
.128*** 
(.034) 
.132*** 
(.042) 
.153*** 
(.040) 
.116** 
(.055) 
Middle manager .071*** 
(.017) 
.111*** 
(.037) 
.114*** 
(.044) 
.143*** 
(.042) 
.127** 
(.055) 
Administrative .007 
(.016) 
.045 
(.035) 
.043 
(.044) 
.067 
(.042) 
.025 
(.059) 
Sales worker .053*** 
(.020) 
.092** 
(.038) 
.113** 
(.046) 
.118*** 
(.045) 
.091 
(.059) 
100 to 499 employees .073*** 
(.019) 
.045** 
(.021) 
.051 
(.031) 
.044** 
(.021) 
.044** 
(.021) 
500 employees or more .113*** 
(.035) 
.073* 
(.038) 
.045 
(.061) 
.073* 
(.038) 
.073* 
(.038) 
Multinational .112*** 
(.021) 
.101*** 
(.021) 
.102*** 
(.021) 
.143*** 
(.032) 
.101*** 
(.021) 
HR Department - .090*** 
(.026) 
.089*** 
(.026) 
.089*** 
(.026) 
.086** 
(.041) 
20 to 40 years .005 
(.023) 
.003 
(.024) 
.003 
(.024) 
.003 
(.024) 
.003 
(.024) 
40 years or more -.027 
(.024) 
-.031 
(.026) 
-.031 
(.026) 
-.030 
(.026) 
-.031 
(.026) 
Number of competitors .002 
(.012) 
.008 
(.013) 
.008 
(.013) 
.008 
(.013) 
.008 
(.013) 
Technological change - .011 
(.008) 
.011 
(.008) 
.011 
(.008) 
.011 
(.008) 
Union influence - .003 
(.008) 
.003 
(.008) 
.003 
(.008) 
0.003 
(.008) 
Quality - .066** 
(.025) 
.066** 
(.025) 
.066** 
(.026) 
.066** 
(.026) 
Flexibility - .081*** 
(.030) 
.081*** 
(.030) 
.081*** 
(.030) 
.081*** 
(.030) 
Innovation - .053 
(.033) 
.054 
(.033) 
.052 
(.033) 
.053 
(.033) 
Exports - .000 
(.003) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
Occupational percentage - .001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.005) 
.001 
(.001) 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Top executive x Medium size - - .002 
(.035) 
- - 
Top executive x Large size - - .070 
(.074) 
- - 
Professional x Medium size - - -.014 
(.035) 
- - 
Professional x Large size - - .057 
(.071) 
- - 
Middle manager x Medium size - - -.007 
(.035) 
- - 
Middle manager x Large size - - .026 
(.069) 
- - 
Administrative x Medium size - - -.001 
(.036) 
- - 
Administrative x Large size - - .042 
(.067) 
- - 
Sales worker x Medium size - - -.023 
(.041) 
- - 
Sales worker x Large size - - -.206* 
(.114) 
- - 
Top executive x Multinational - - - -.026 
(.034) 
- 
Professional x Multinational - - - -.055* 
(.033) 
- 
Middle manager x Multinational - - - -.074** 
(.034) 
- 
Administrative x Multinational - - - -.042 
(.034) 
- 
Sales worker x Multinational - - - -.054 
(.042) 
- 
Top executive x HR Department - - - - .008 
 
 
 
50 
(.043) 
Professional x HR Department - - - - .013 
(.046) 
Middle manager x HR Department - - - - -.022 
(.046) 
Administrative x HR Department - - - - .023 
(.051) 
Sales worker x HR Department - - - - -.000 
(.053) 
Chi-squared 265.31*** 256.63*** 275.62*** 268.94*** 276.52*** 
Pseudo R2 0.0842 0.1066 0.1086 0.1077 0.1069 
N 5135 4484 4484 4484 4484 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Note: Table shows marginal effects (with standard errors clustered at the plant level in brackets) 
 
 
 
Table 9. Wald Tests: Chi-Squared Values 
 ANY INDIVIDUAL GROUP PLANT OR FIRM 
Sales worker -  Top executive 16.30*** 66.68*** 6.42**a 57.44*** a 
Sales worker – Professional 103.82*** 157.48*** 1.05 a 6.69* a 
Sales worker – Administrative 284.92*** 275.10*** 15.71***  9.02** 
Sales worker – Middle manager 86.65*** 137.15*** 3.39* a 1.65 a 
Top executive – Professional 73.99*** 38.85*** 3.82* 61.53*** 
Top executive – Administrative 266.62*** 124.32*** 48.60*** 144.58*** 
Top executive – Middle manager 47.29*** 25.11*** 0.77 74.56*** 
Middle manager - Professional 1.60 0.91 1.61 a 3.02* a 
Middle manager - Administrative 147.55***  61.62*** 59.28***  33.42*** 
Professional - Administrative 142.25*** 58.50*** 45.61*** 54.66*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
Note: Table 9 displays the results of the tests of coefficient equality obtained in the first model of tables 5 to 8. In each cell, we test 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient of the first occupation equals the coefficient of the second occupation versus the alternative 
hypothesis that the coefficient of the first occupation is higher than the coefficient of the second occupation. In the cells with a 
superscript, we test the null hypothesis versus the alternative hypothesis that the coefficient of the second occupation is higher than 
the coefficient of the first occupation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
